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Abstract
Perfect risk sharing is not an optimal design for financial system because it
can increase systemic risk by facilitating risk contagion among financial insti-
tutions. However, risk sharing dominates betting according to most Pareto
efficiency criteria. One reason for this might be that those Pareto criteria
consider individual risk rather than systemic risk and neglect that betting
may reduce systemic risk by segmenting the financial system and preventing
financial contagion. Refining Pareto criterion to cover systemic risk, I pro-
pose the systemic Pareto criterion which has two features: 1) satisfying facts
that betting dominates risk sharing when systemic risk is considered. 2) be-
ing applicable to scenarios with constant endowment to which current criteria
cannot provide compelling suggestions. One implication from this paper is
that betting can act as the stabilizer of the economy and prohibiting betting
is not always helpful for financial stability.
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1. Introduction
The view that perfect risk sharing is the optimal allocation has been
widely held by economists for a long time. However, since the 2007/08 U.S.
financial crisis, a growing body of literature has pointed that perfect risk
sharing can undermine the financial stability by allowing risk propagating
among financial network and increasing systemic risk. For example, Stiglitz
(2010a,b) questions if full integration or full risk sharing is always desirable
for financial system and concludes that risk sharing is not the optimal finan-
cial architecture due to the high probability of system-wide failure. Acemoglu
et al. (2015) argues that whether a more complete financial network is better
or not depends on the magnitude and the number of negative shocks. The
similar view is also held by Dasgupta (2004), Allen et al. (2012), Battiston
et al. (2012) and Castiglionesi et al. (2017).
Traditionally, risking sharing is encouraged because it can diversify indi-
vidual risk. However, the incentive of diversification also makes the financial
institutions more interconnected or homogenous and increases the systemic
risk. This tension between the two roles is also discussed by Beale et al.
(2011) and Haldane and May (2011).
Another reason that risk sharing is welcomed may come from the equiv-
alence of Pareto optima and risk sharing, which is discussed by Back (2010).
If the agents are risk averse and homogenous in beliefs about the uncertainty,
risk sharing naturally arises from the Pareto optimal allocation. Although
the classic Pareto optimality criterion faces difficulties under heterogeneous
belief conditions and has been modified to various forms, the risk sharing
allocation is still optimal according to those criteria. This is the problem I
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attempt to solve, thus I propose a Pareto criterion on systemic risk under
which risk sharing can be dominated by betting. The intuition behind the
judgement is that risk sharing increases systemic risk while betting reduces
it.
In addition to the ”risk sharing always wins” issue, another trouble that
classic Pareto criterion encounters is mentioned by Hammond (1981) and
Nielsen (2003, 2018). Since the ex-ante Pareto efficient allocation may not
be ex-post optimal due to the overconfidence or information misperception
of agents, those studies suggest that substituting the classic (ex-ante) Pareto
criterion with ex-post welfare optimality. However, as Mongin (2016) crit-
icizes, the distinctions between ex-ante and ex-post Pareto optimality are
”between differing and identical subjective probabilities rather than between
two temporal stages of analysis” and ”the ex-post Pareto principle is in-
tended to serve at the ex-ante stage”. In this paper, I have no intention of
going further into those arguments but respect the traditions that making
the welfare comparison at ex-ante stage.
From ex-ante perspective, Gilboa et al. (2014) and Brunnermeier et al.
(2014) refine the classic Pareto criterion and propose their versions of Pareto
efficiency— no-betting Pareto and belief-neutral Pareto criteria. They both
favor risk sharing which is more efficient in their views and disapprove bet-
ting which could cause ex-post inefficiency or negative externality. Their
conclusions contradict with mine because they do not take systemic risk into
account. For example, the derivatives backed by the housing values were
shared by the markets in United States in 2007 and most people agreed on
that housing price will rise in the future (see Foote et al. (2012)). The risk
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sharing allocation based on similar beliefs seems fine from the above crite-
ria, but in fact it contained great systemic risk and betting on housing price
could reduce this risk.
In addition, I follow this strand of research and assume that the social
planner does not know the objective (true) probability and take no stand
when the agents hold heterogenous beliefs. The reasons why heterogenous
beliefs arise are various, such as irrationality of agents, different background
or experience and distortions in updating(see Brunnermeier et al. (2014)).
Whatever the reasons may be, the planner cannot use a ”presentative” belief
to make welfare comparisons. This plausible assumption makes our analysis
necessary, otherwise the planner is able to use the only correct probability
to measure social welfare. Since my work is closely related to theirs, I will
leave further discussion for Section 4.
Another strand of literature related to mine is utilitarian aggregation of
individual preference. Harsanyi (1955) shows that a classic Pareto condition
holds if and only if utility function of society can be presented by a convex
average of individuals’ utility function when they hold homogenous belief
about uncertainty. Gilboa et al. (2004) extend this axiom under Savage
(1972)’s framework where all agents are Subjective Expected Utility (SEU)
maximizer but restrict the Pareto condition to the alternatives on which
agents hold identical belief. Furthermore, Alon and Gayer (2016) and Danan
et al. (2016) also aggregate preference of individuals under various restricted
Pareto conditions which, however, cannot allow the heterogeneity in belief
and utility simultaneously.
In this paper, I follow the tradition of Gilboa et al. (2014) and focus on
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decentralized decisions making under heterogenous beliefs without intention
to providing complete social ranking by aggregating preference of individuals.
2. Example
In this section, I will give a dilemma which cannot be perfectly solved
by recent Pareto criteria proposed by Brunnermeier et al. (2014) and Gilboa
et al. (2014). And then I will show how the systemic Pareto criterion I
propose solves it.
The Kings dilemma:2
Two kingdoms stand next to each other. A bad king rules one of them
and has a daughter. To assure the princess will marry to the strongest man,
he announce that he will marry his daughter to the winner of the contest. A
good king rules another kingdom and he has two sons, Aaron and Ben. They
can choose to attend the contest or not and then there would be three po-
tential outcomes for each of them: (no attendance, attendance and success,
attendance and defeat). Suppose for each prince, the payoffs over the out-
comes are the same:(0, 1,−1). If Aaron and Ben are very confident (but no
one knows the exact probability of the outcomes) to triumph in the contest,
then they would like to try their luck provided the expected payoffs are high
enough. Assume the good king is Paretian and should he let his sons attend
the contest?
If he decide to respect the will of Aaron and Ben and let them go (to
2This example is adapted from Nielsen (2018).
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bet), he will have to accept the ”one win and one lose” consequence which
violates the Pareto principle at ex-post stage. This scenario named ”spurious
unanimity” has been studied by Gilboa et al. (2014) and Mongin (2016).
Otherwise, he will hurt the feelings of his sons and reject the potential Pareto
improvement in the ex-ante stage.
No-betting and belief-neutral Pareto criteria are two recent accomplish-
ments in Pareto efficiency refinement under heterogenous beliefs. Next I will
show that they cannot provide compelling answers for the good king.
2.1. No-betting Pareto criterion
For two allocations f and g, no-betting Pareto reckons f more efficient
than g if 1) all agents involved prefer f to g under their subjective beliefs and
2) there exists a hypothetical probability which can rationalize the preference.
Suppose the princes are risk neutral and maximizing expected utilities
with respect to their subjective probabilities and a hypothetical probability
over (Aaron wins, Ben wins) is (p, 1 − p). It is easy to show that no such
hypothetical belief can rationalize their options of attending the contest.
Because Aaron’s decision to go requires that p ∗ 1 − (1 − p) ∗ 1 > 0 while
Ben’s decision to go requires that (1− p) ∗ 1− p ∗ 1 > 0. No-betting Pareto
criterion excludes the option of letting them go owing to no common beliefs
shared by the princes, and suggests that the good king should not support
their decisions of betting.
The underlying assumption for this suggestion is that ex-post efficiency is
more important than ex-ante efficiency. However, compared with the cost of
neglecting ex-ante efficiency and ensuring ex-post efficiency (which is hardly
to measure), it might be less costly to ensure ex-ante efficiency and remedy
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the ex-post inefficiency by proper transfer plans (i.e., the good king ask the
winning son give his fortune to the losing son). In such sense, no-betting
Pareto criterion does not offer a compelling suggestion for the good king.
2.2. Belief neutral Pareto criterion
For two allocations f and g, belief neutral Pareto views that f dominates
g if for every belief p in the convex hull of beliefs of all agents, every agent
weakly prefers f to g and at least one agent strictly prefers f to g.
Assume that Aaron and Ben are both 90% certain of winning in the
contest and (λ, 1 − λ), where 0 < λ < 1, are weights of beliefs assigned to
Aaron and Ben. Then the linear combination of their beliefs over (Aaron
wins, Ben wins) is (0.8λ + 0.1,0.9− 0.8λ). For every belief in the belief set,
the expected utilities of betting for Aaron and Ben are (0.8λ + 0.1) ∗ 1 −
(0.9 − 0.8λ) = 1.6λ − 0.8 and (0.9 − 0.8λ) ∗ 1 − (0.8λ + 0.1) = 0.8 − 1.6λ,
respectively. Apparently they cannot be positive or negative at the same
time, which means that the allocation of betting is neither dominating nor
being dominated by the allocation of no betting. Therefore, belief-neutral
Pareto criterion cannot offer advice for the good king.3.
2.3. Systemic Pareto criterion
Here I will show how systemic Pareto criterion solve this dilemma by
adding extra disturbance. The King’s dilemma may remind us of game theory
where multiple Nash equilibriums arise and we only need the most reasonable
one—the perfect equilibrium. Next I apply the spirit of trembling hand
3This is the incompleteness of belief-neutral Pareto criterion and more details can be
found in Brunnermeier et al. (2014)
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perfect equilibrium4 to solve the dilemma. Assume the irritable bad king
may lose his temper with a small probability ε > 0. When he gets angry, he
could aggress upon the good king if none of his sons attend the contest or
break his promise even if the princes complete the contest, with the results
that Aaron and Ben both receive the worst payoff −c ≤ −1. Now the set
of potential outcomes is (no attendance and no invasion, no attendance and
invasion, attendance and Aaron wins, attendance and Ben wins, attendance
and no one wins). And the corresponding payoffs for Aaron and Ben are
(0,−c, 1,−1,−c) and (0,−c,−1, 1,−c), respectively. The expected payoff of
not going for them is
(1− ε) ∗ 0 + ε ∗ (−c) = −c ∗ ε
According to the persistent belief (see, for example Battigalli and Bonanno
(1997) and Ko and Huang (2012)), people are reluctant to adjust their beliefs
when new information is unfavorable to their priors. Back to this example,
the possibility of bad king going mad changes from 0 to ε and this shock
should have negligible effect on the beliefs of winning for Aaron and Ben
(since they are quite sure of their victory). Thus Aaron’s belief on (atten-
dance and Aaron wins, attendance and Ben wins, attendance and no one
wins) would be (0.9, 0.1 − ε, ε) and the same adjustment is for Ben. The
expected payoff of betting for them is
0.9 ∗ 1− (0.1− ε)− ε ∗ c = 0.8 + ε− c ∗ ε
4Since the bad king is not a player, this is not the exact trembling hand refinement in
game theory.
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Table 1: Aaron’s (Ben’s) strategy
Option Expected payoffs Loss caused by shock
Bet 0.8 + ε− c ∗ ε c ∗ ε− ε
No bet −c ∗ ε c ∗ ε
Comparison 0.8 + ε− c ∗ ε > −c ∗ ε c ∗ ε− ε < c ∗ ε
Compared with the original story, the chance of the bad king going mad
reduces the payoffs of Aaron and Ben regardless of their choices, but the
extents to which the payoffs are reduced are different. If the good king
prevent his sons of attending the contest, the payoffs reduced for each prince
is 0 + c ∗ ε = c ∗ ε. If not, the payoffs reduced for each prince is 0.8− (0.8 +
ε − c ∗ ε) = c ∗ ε − ε. Clearly, payoffs decease greater if the princes do not
bet and the difference of reduced payoffs can help the good king make the
decision. The analysis is summarized in Table 2.3.
In addition to the welfare of his sons, the good king also care about
the changes caused by the ”trembling hands”. Intuitively, the society wants
the potential negative shock has small, rather than large, effect on people’s
expectation. For example, although unpredictable earthquake or disease out-
breaks may happen tomorrow with very small probability, it should be better
for everyone to neglect it and live normally. In the same sense the good king
should allow his sons to attend the contest because they would suffer less
expected utility loss in that situation.
This is how I incorporate systemic risk into Pareto principle. From utili-
tarian perspectives, social planner only care about the level of utility of the
agents. However, the variance of utility of the agents also matters when the
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”King’s dilemma” arises. The variance represents the risk of the whole sys-
tem because smaller the variances are for every agent, the more resilient the
system is.
Here I interpret this example: Aaron and Ben represent two parties who
want to bet; The good king is the social planner or government who care
about the welfare of each party and the systemic risk; The bad king signifies
the economy or nature. The nature is hardly to predict so that we can never
reject the possibility that a disaster happens and we get the worst results
(i.e., Aaron and Ben get −c when the bad king go mad). The negligible
possibility serves as the trembling hands in Nash equilibriums and helps the
planner find the efficient allocation for each one without comparing the ex-
ante and ex-post efficiencies. Betting dominates risk sharing because betting
reduces systemic risk, which can be seen from the example—Aaron and Ben
are less affected by the idea of crazy king when they bet.
3. Model
After the informal illustration, I will present the systemic Pareto criterion
formally in this section.
3.1. Setup
The environment setup in this paper is similar to that of Gilboa et al.
(2014). There is a measurable state space (S,Σ) and an outcomes set X.
The mappings from S to X are contained in an acts set F . The set N =
{1, 2, ..., n} contains all the agents in the society and each agent i ∈ N
has a preference relation %i over F . The preference %i is characterized by
maximizing
∫
S
ui(f(s))dpi, where ui is a utility functions mapping X to R
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and pi is a probability measure on (S,Σ). In addition, there is no aggregate
uncertainty in the society, which means the total wealth of the society is
constant until the ”trembling hands” reduces the total wealth.
3.2. Pareto criterion
Now I will give the formal definition appeared in the previous example.
First, I define belief persistence as follows:
Definition 1. An agent is belief persistent if the probability assigned to a
new state rise from 0 to ε > 0 and the probability of the favored state which
he thought was most likely to happen would not change.
For example, in King’s Dilemma, Aaron and Ben are belief persistent
because the probability of bad king going crazy increase from 0 to ε but
they still believe that they will win with the probability 0.9. In other words,
king going crazy and losing the contest seem the same for them so those
two events share the probability assigned previously to losing the contest.
That agents are belief persistent is a strong assumption but can be relaxed
by allowing the shock has large effect on the probability of unfavored states.
What follows is the definition of another essential concept—systemic risk.
Definition 2. Given all agents are belief persistent, for two allocations f
and g, f is less systemic risky than g if the inclusion of a new state, the
probability of which increase from 0 to ε > 0, reduces less expected utility loss
of each agent in f than in g. That is, ∀i,
4U fi ≤ 4U gi
with the inequality holding strictly for at least one agent, where 4Uai , a ∈
(f, g) is the reduction of expected utility of agent i in allocation f or g.
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Now the systemic Pareto criterion can be defined as follows:
Definition 3. Given the agents are belief persistent, for two alternatives f
and g, f is more systemic Pareto (SP) efficient than g if:
(1) every agent in the society prefers f than g, that is ∀i,∫
S
ui(f)dpi ≥
∫
S
ui(g)dpi,
with the inequality holding strictly for at least one agent.
(2) f is less systemic risk than g.
Condition (1) guarantees the systemic Pareto criterion is a refinement
of the classic Pareto criterion and Condition (2) gives the reason why an
allocation is more efficient in a set of Pareto efficient allocations.
Proposition 1. Given the agents are belief persistent and aggregate endow-
ment is constant, betting is more SP efficient than risk sharing.
Proof. For any allocation resulting from voluntary trade, condition (1) is
always satisfied and thus not crucial for justifying that betting is more effi-
cient. Betting dominates risk sharing because betting is less systemic risky
and next I will prove it.
Consider an allocation of betting f . For an agent, the subset Smax
contains all the states he think is most likely to happen, that is Smax =
arg max
s∈S
pi(s). And S
c
max contains all the other states which are not included
in Smax. The expected utility of him can be expressed as
∫
Smax
ui(f)dpi +∫
Scmax
ui(f)dpi. And for s1 ∈ Smax and s2 ∈ Scmax, ui(f(s1)) ≥ ui(f(s2))
holds for betting. Suppose the probability of a state s0 increases from
0 to ε and ui(f(s0)) ≤ ui(f(s)),∀s 6= s0. Now the expected utility is
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∫
Smax
ui(f)dpi +
∫
Scmax
ui(f)dp
′
i + pi(s0) ∗ ui(f(s0)). Because the agents are
belief persistent,
∫
Smax
ui(f)dpi is not affected but
∫
Scmax
ui(f)dpi is changed
to
∫
Scmax
ui(f)dp
′
i due to the inclusion of the new state. Hence, the reduction
of expected utility is
∫
Scmax
ui(f)dpi −
∫
Scmax
ui(f)dp
′
i − pi(s0) ∗ ui(f(s0)) =
ε ∗ ui(f(s∗2))− ε ∗ ui(f(s0)) for some s∗2 ∈ Smax.
In an allocation of risk sharing g, the constant endowment guarantees
that ∀s3 ∈ S, ui(f(s1)) ≥ ui(g(s3) ≥ ui(f(s2)) with inequalities holding
strictly for some i. And his expected utility is
∫
S
ui(g)dpi and reduction of
expected utility is
∫
S
ui(g)dpi−
∫
S
ui(g)dp
′
i−pi(s0)∗ui(g(s0)) = ε∗ui(g(s∗3))−
ε ∗ ui(f(s0)) for some s∗3 ∈ S. With ui(f(s0)) = ui(g(s0)) and ui(f(s∗2)) ≤
ui(g(s
∗
3), it is obvious that ε ∗ ui(f(s∗2)) − ε ∗ ui(f(s0)) ≤ ε ∗ ui(g(s∗3)) − ε ∗
ui(f(s0)) with inequality holding strictly for some i. This implies that f is
less systemic risky than g by definition.
4. Discussion
In this section, I will compare the systemic Pareto criterion with no bet-
ting and belief neutral Pareto criteria. Here I offer three angles to distinguish
mine form those two criteria.
4.1. Constant endowment
One seemingly strong assumption applied in this paper is that no aggre-
gate uncertainty in the model. Specifically, the total wealth of the society is
constant before including a new state.
This is contrary to the setting in Brunnermeier et al. (2014) who assign
a positive or negative externality to a trade before evaluating its efficiency.
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Belief-neutral Pareto criterion works when the externality is uniformly posi-
tive or negative under every reasonable belief in the combinations of beliefs
of all agents. For example, given negative externality caused by betting re-
ducing social wealth, belief-neutral Pareto criterion is able to identify the
negative externality and claims the betting is inefficient.
However, its ability is compromised when the negative externality pre-
sumption is abandoned. For instance, in the example Speculative Motive of
Brunnermeier et al. (2014), authors assign no clear negative externality to
betting but claim that betting can cause agents to take excessive risk and
impose negative effect on the society. This is questionable because a riskier
individual allocation may involve less systemic risk and does not necessar-
ily mean that it is inefficient for the society. Overall, the rationale behind
belief-neutral Pareto criterion depends on the presumption of externality.
I am not denying that in some cases we can identify its externality of a
trade before it is completed, but this may not be true for most cases. Usu-
ally, we are uncertain of the results caused by a deal and cannot assume its
externality in advance. Therefore, I assume there is no aggregate uncertainty
in the model and this helps us to assess social welfare in those cases.
4.2. Parentalism
Belief-neutral Pareto criterion is paternalistic because it ignores indi-
vidual preference when evaluating social welfare. One trouble caused by
Parentalism is that an inefficient allocation f can be undominated by any
other allocation g. Consider an economy with two agents—Aaron and Ben,
using Aaron’s belief, Aaron is indifferent between f and g while Ben prefers g
to f . In addition, using Ben’s belief, Ben is indifferent between f and g, but
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Aaron also thinks that g is better than f . As a result, each one is indifferent
between f and g using his own belief but the society reckons f as inefficient.
To the contrary, systemic Pareto criterion do not require planner consider
preferences generated by maximizing ones’ expected utilities using other’s
beliefs. The condition (1) in the Proposition ensures that systemic Pareto
criterion coincides with the notion of classic Pareto principle.
4.3. Robustness
No betting Pareto criterion is not robust to the inclusion of a new state.
For example, f did not dominate g according to no betting Pareto criterion
before a new state was included. However, if a new state which increase the
wealth of every agent arises, then f dominates g after the inclusion of the
new state.
The systemic Pareto criterion also considers inclusion of a new state but
it is different from the above case. The shock included in this paper which
reduces the wealth of all agents and acts like a ”trembling hand”. Then if
f dominates g according to classic Pareto and f involves less systemic risk
than g, we can conclude that f is systemic Pareto efficient than g.
Furthermore, adding the model a new state which increase the wealth of
every agent is beyond the scope of belief persistence. It is difficult to argue
that such a state is against or for the priors. For example, if the bad king
will give Aaron and Ben a castle when a new state realized. This is hard to
say whether Aaron and Ben are less certain of their defeat or victory when
they take such a possibility into consideration.
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5. Conclusion
This paper proposes a Pareto criterion refinement which takes the risk of
whole society into account. It shows that given certain assumptions, prefect
risk sharing is not the optimal allocation and dominated by betting, which
echoes with the research of Stiglitz (2010b), Beale et al. (2011) and Haldane
and May (2011).
It is worthy of noting that I am not denying the positive effect of risk
sharing in normal situations. When global economy is stable, for example,
more trade liberalization and financial integration can bring more benefit
for participating countries. What I am suggesting is that when economy is
ambiguious and there is a small but positive probability that we all suffer, it is
not reasonable to purse prefect risk sharing and forbid betting. Furthermore,
betting may reduce systemic risk and act as a stabilizer of the economy.
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